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INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade after the highly publicized small  boat 
attacks against the USS Cole (in 2000) and M/V Limburg (in 
2002) in Yemen, small vessels continue to pose a security 
threat to ports worldwide. At ports, small vessels frequently 
operate in close proximity to important maritime 
infrastructure, such as bridges and petrochemical plants, and 
to passenger and military ships. (Department of Homeland 
Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy, 2008)
An attacker can be easily camouflaged among innocent 
small  vessel traffic and avoid detection by being in the crowd, 
all the while approaching its desired target undetected and 
unopposed. When the attacker finally decides to execute the 
attack, separating from the main traffic to speed toward its 
target, there is only a  narrow time window for an effective 
defender response.
Two factors confound the defense against such attacks. 
The first is the lack of warning, which leads to the inability of 
a defender to anticipate the true target of the attack from 
among the many possible targets and hence is unable to pre-
position any assets to protect the target. The second factor is 
that the effort to classify the malicious intention of a would-be 
attacker is non-trivial, since the attacker would look like an 
innocent vessel from afar. Conceivably, a further difficulty the 
defender would face is the restriction of maneuver space for 
an interception attempt in a shipping channel with high 
traffic, especially if the terrorist boat weaves in and out among 
the innocent vessels.
The objective of the study is to explore the effects of 
neutrals on the effectiveness of the defender’s deterrence and 
interdiction operations against a small boat attack in a port 
environment. The goal of the team was to identify robust 
employment tactics of port security forces to detect, defend 
and/or intercept a spectrum of threats and adversary tactics, 
through the use of MANA and a red-teaming process.
Scenario and Modeling
The Port of Lisbon was chosen for the study scenario. Lisbon 
is a wealthy and important city, with its busy port 
contributing significantly to commerce and trade. The city of 
Lisbon is also a key tourist icon 
in Portugal, being one of the 
oldest cities of the world, richly 
endowed with history dating 
from the Neolithic era, and is 
also home to two UNESCO 
World Heritage Sites – Belém 
Tower and Jerónimos 
Monastery (Wikipedia). The city 
and port present many potential 
targets for terrorists to strike 
from the sea and, together with 
the high volume of traffic in a 
narrow straits, poses a 
challenge for the navy and 
maritime police to defend.
A busy section of the Tagus 
River at Lisbon, of 
approximately 10 by 5 km, was 
modelled (see Figure 1). Initial 
7 - IDFW 21 - Team 2
Figure 1: Port of Lisbon
runs with the terrain map crashed due to insufficient pixels, 
but this issue was overcome by increasing the pixel resolution. 
Three types of agents are modelled:
• Neutrals: Commercial and recreational shipping 
traffic (neutral vessels) ply the channel in the center of 
the straits.
• Attacker: The attacker is presumed to employ a 
speedboat in the 20-foot class, such as the Baja Outlaw 
20, and is capable of carrying 4 to 6 persons, or a few 
hundred pounds of explosives, at high speeds. The 
attacker seeks to be camouflaged among traffic, 
entering the region from the west, and joining the 
stream of neutral vessel traffic. 
One intention of the team was to model the attacker’s 
ability to randomly choose a target along the coast to 
attack. However, due to the complexity of modelling 
and calibrating the behaviour of the neutral vessels, 
which consumed most of the time at the workshop, 
this objective was set aside. Instead, the attacker was 
given just one target – the naval base on the east of the 
area of operations considered.
If the attacker boat is unopposed in its approach to the 
target, it will follow the shipping traffic until it reaches 
the shortest path to the target, at which point the 
attacker will speed up to maximum speed and execute 
a strike. This modus operandi simulates a high level of 
surprise that can be accorded to the attacker.
• Defender: The defending boats are assumed to be 
patrol boats equivalent to the SAFE Boat International 
Defender class boat, widely used by the US Coast 
Guard. They are tasked to perform random checks on 
vessels in the channel, and are either deployed in a 
barrier  patrol profile or to sweep the channel (see 
Figure 2).
Figure 2: Patrol Locations and Attacker’s Target
Agent Interactions
Each patrol boat selects a neutral vessel within its sensor 
range at random, proceeds toward it and stops the vessel for 
inspection. The inspection takes 5 minutes to complete, after 
which the vessel will  be tagged as a non-threatening vessel 
and will not be stopped if it later meets other patrol boats. 
During an inspection, the patrol boat will be unable to 
classify any other vessel in its sensor range. After an 
inspection, the patrol boat will travel for 5 minutes before 
looking for the next vessel to inspect, to avoid getting fixed in 
a single location. These two 5 minute gaps potentially allow 
for an attacker to sneak past the patrol boats.
On the other hand, if the patrol boat stops and inspects an 
attacker boat, the attacker will be known immediately, and the 
interception will be counted a success. If the attacker sees the 
patrol boat, it will speed up and attempt to outrun the 
defending patrol boat, and head for  its target. The patrol boat 
will give chase and attempt to stop the attacker. However, the 
attacker has a head-start that leads to an advantage in the 
chase (since the maximum speeds of both boats are the same).
Experiment Setup
The probability of at least 1 successful attack is used as the 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) in this study. A small 
experiment was designed to verify the model in the 
workshop, using the factor and level settings given in Table 
1. 
Factors Levels
Number of Neutrals 8 - 20
Number of Blue patrol boats 1 - 3
Number of Red attackers 1 - 3
Speed of Blue patrols Patrol speed: 10 - 30 kts (Max: 40 kts)
Evasive Speed of Red Attackers 40 kts (Fixed)
Sensor Range Det: 3000 - 6000 mClass: 200 - 1000 m
Table 1: Factors and Levels
The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube design of 
experiments spreadsheet was used to obtain 33 design points 
(NOLH spreadsheet, downloaded from harvest.nps.edu), and 
50 replications of each design point were run.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We anticipated the effects of the factors as follows:
Factor Proportion of Successful Attacks
More patrols Reduced
More attackers Increased
Longer sensor range Reduced
Speed of patrols Increased
More neutral shipping Increased
Table 2: Anticipated Factor Effects on the MOE
The simulation results were analyzed through a partition 
tree followed by a logistic fit (see Figure 3), yielding two 
unexpected findings. We found that the speed of patrols had 
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marginal effect on the proportion of 
successful attacks, and a surprise finding 
that more neutrals had resulted in a higher 
probability of detection. 
Scrutiny of the simulation showed 
that due to the higher volume of traffic, 
the patrol boats were spending more time 
in the centre of the channel. Since the route 
the attacker takes passes through the 
center of the channel, the chance of a 
patrol detecting the attacker was higher. 
We rationalized that this artifact was a 
model-specific issue.
Conclusion
Within the short span of the workshop, 
the team managed to assemble and verify 
a basic model for exploring the defense 
against small boat attacks in the complex 
environment of a port. This experiment 
opens the way for further study by 
detailing the scenario and providing the 
building blocks of agent behavior in a 
MANA model.
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Figure 3: Partition Tree and Logistic FiT
